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How Labeling of Safety and Process
Attributes Affects Markets for Food
Julie A. CasweU
Consumers are increasingly considering information on the safety and process (how foods are
produced) attributes of food in making their buying decisions, Producers, processors, and
retailers may choose voluntary labeling of these attributes, may be required to label by
government regulations, or may use a combination of these approaches, The market effects
depend on consumer perceptions of the attributes, the benefits and costs of labeling for
companies, and the goals of government policy, These effects are illustrated through a
discussion of labeling of foods that are produced with the use of biotechnology (genetically
modified organisms) or that are organically grown.
The safety of food products and the characteristics
of the processes used to produce them are becom-
ing increasingly important in the operation of food
systems, Consumers are considering information
on these attributes in making their purchasing de-
cisions, while governments and companies are
choosing labeling options. Producers, processors,
and retailers may voluntarily choose to label the
safety and process attributes of their products or
may be required to do so by government regula-
tions, Frequently a combination of vohtntary and
mandatory approaches to labeling is in place. Our
discussion uses several examples to illustrate how
the market effects of labeling depend upon its im-
pact on consumer perceptions of the product attrib-
utes, the benefits and costs of labeling for compa-
nies, and the goals of government policy.
The use of labeling on food products is gaining
in prominence in many countries as a regulatory
tool to inform consumers and influence markets for
food quality. Labeling policies may be used as a
substitute for more restrictive forms of government
regulation or as a complement to other policies. In
either case, governments can use labeling policies
to reach food quality targets, to encourage compe-
tition in product markets, and to provide consum-
ers with information and protection from decep-
tion. Labeling policies differ from other regulatory
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approaches because they work more directly in
conjunction with consumer demand in the market-
place. At the same time, food companies have a
vital interest in the voluntary use of labels as a
means of differentiating their products to consum-
ers.
Markets for Food Quality Attributes
Standard tools of economic analysis apply to mar-
kets for quality attributes. Consumers’ market de-
mand is expressed by their willingness to pay for
higher levels of quality attributes, which in turn
reflects their perception of the benefits they receive
from those attributes (Caswell and Mojduszka
1996), In most cases, the amount that consumers
are willing to pay for each additional unit of a
partictdar quality attribute will fall (Swinbank
1993). Consumers with different preferences, in-
cluding different risk preferences, will rationally
choose different bundles of foods. These choices
will maximize the consumers’ utility from their
food purchases as long as their perceptions of the
quality attributes of foods are correct. In other
words, consumers will buy those products that give
them the most value, as long as they are able to
accurately judge the quality attributes,
On the supply side of the market, food producers
supply food quality if it is profitable for them or if
they are required to do so (Caswell and Mojduszka
1996), Economic models of food quality usually
assume that the marginal cost of supplying addi-
tional units of food quality is likely to increase, In
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(marginal benefit) curve intersects with the rising
supply (marginal cost) curve to determine an opti-
mum level of food quality at a market clearing
price. Markets for food quality rarely work per-
fectly, however, most often because information is
imperfect. As a result, governments are active in
regulating markets for food quality using a range
of regulatory regimes including input standards,
process standards, product performance standards,
information requirements, conditions of sale or ser-
vice requirements, and conditions of use require-
ments. The ultimate target of these regulatory re-
gimes is to ensure certain levels of important qual-
ity attributes or to prevent consumer deception.
The economics literature now includes a large
body of work on markets for quality and on how
quality is communicated (signaled) to consumers,
These models focus on the types of goods or at-
tributes being sold, asymmetries in the quality in-
formation available to buyers and sellers, compa-
nies’ incentives to provide quality and quality in-
formation, the structure of markets, and how
government regulation may affect markets for
product quality,
The effects of information asymmetries on mar-
ket operation are most important to analysis of vol-
untary and mandatory labeling programs. The in-
formation environment is characterized by whether
the product’s important attributes are search, expe-
rience, or credence attributes (Nelson 1970, 1974;
Darby and Karni 1973). The safety and process
attributes we are concerned with here are largely or
wholly credence attributes, where the consumer
cannot judge the quality even after he or she in-
spects, buys, and uses the product, For example, a
consumer cannot reliably judge whether a food has
been produced organically by inspecting or using
the product, nor is it practicable for the consumer
to have the product tested to verify its quality.
Companies may use quality signaling, but a repu-
table certification agent is often required because
consumers cannot verify the truthfulness of the
claims. Where truthful labeling is used, it trans-
forms credence attributes into search attributes, al-
lowing the consumer to judge the product before
purchase. The intent of labeling policy is to im-
prove the information environment in order to im-
prove the functioning of markets for the quality
attributes themselves,
Regulatory Choices for Food Labeling
Public policies to influence the information envi-
ronment for products can take several forms. There
may be no policy on claims for particular attrib-
utes, leaving companies free to use claims volun-
tarily as they see fit. More frequently, a basic
policy that claims may not be deceptive is in place,
with governments engaging in case-by-case en-
forcement against questionable claims, This type
of activity regulates claims by using prominent
cases as examples to set parameters for acceptable
labeling practices. For example, in the United
States during the early 1990s, the Food and Drug
Administration successfully challenged several
companies’ label claims that their pasta sauces or
orange juice products were “fresh” when the
products were heat-processed. Governments may
also publish guidelines indicating the types of
claims they are likely to find acceptable.
Beyond these basic policies, governments may
require mandatory disclosure of information about
the nature of a product or how it should be used;
may place controls on voluntary claims used in
product promotion or the use of product names;
may provide public information and education;
and may subsidize the provision of information
(Caswell and Mojduszka 1996), The choice of la-
beling policy depends in significant part on the
existing incentives companies have to make claims
and disclose information. Companies have market
incentives to do so for the positive but not the
negative attributes of their products. Mandatory
disclosure requirements may force disclosure of
negative attributes or the balanced disclosure of
positive and negative attributes. For example, nu-
trition labeling may require a complete accounting
of the nutrient content of a product or require that
if a voluntary claim is made (e.g., high fiber), then
information on all nutrients must be provided (e.g.,
fat and cholesterol content). Labeling regulations
that mandate disclosure of information or circum-
scribe voluntarily provided information perform
the basic transformation of former credence attrib-
utes into search attributes.
Labeling policies require a significant level of
support functions, primarily in the form of stan-
dards setting and enforcement or certification.
They usually require specific standards regarding
the types of attributes that must or may be labeled
and the form that claims take, Labeling standards
must also be updated over time to keep in step with
the evolution of scientific information and under-
standing of effective communication methods.
Once standards are set, labeling policies require
certification and/or enforcement programs to en-
sure compliance. Certification programs may be
private or public, while some public enforcement
mechanism is required to assure the overall integ-
rity of the labeling program.
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quality signaling and the market for quality attrib-
utes where private markets and incentives are not
functioning adequately. It should be recognized,
however, that labeling programs have the possibil-
ity of stifling or damaging the development of pri-
vate markets for food quality attributes (Ippolito
and Mathios 1990, 1996), particularly if they are
not well designed. For example, government qual-
ity standards and labeling formats may fall behind
new developments in product formulation and pre-
sentation, making it more difficult for new prod-
ucts and processes to be introduced. They could
also stifle competition among companies to make
claims because they limit the range and form of
these claims. These considerations indicate that
regulators must be cognizant of how private mar-
kets for quality signaling, quality certification, and
quality itself are operating. When considering la-
beling programs, governments must evaluate the
potential for private systems to operate efficiently.
Improvements in information, if well designed,
should create incentives for manufacturers to com-
pete for market shares from sales to attribute-
conscious, label-using consumers.
Labeling of Food Safety Attributes
In most countries, labeling has not been a promi-
nently used regulatory tool in the area of food
safety, nor has voluntary labeling of food safety
attributes by companies been widespread, Govern-
ments and companies have extensive inspection
and quality assurance programs in place intended
to assure that unsafe products do not reach con-
sumers. Labeling policies may be used to comple-
ment or substitute for direct regulation by govern-
ment. For example, a government could require
testing and labeling of foodborne pathogen levels
in meat products, in effect creating a market for
reduced pathogen levels as companies compete for
market share. This policy could be pursued as a
complement to inspection programs, with labeling
applying to attribute levels below the maximum set
by the regulatory system for negative attributes and
above the minimum for positive attributes, Alter-
natively, labeling could be used instead of inspec-
tion and standards programs if the government
thought the market for the attribute would work
reasonably well as long as the information envi-
ronment was improved.
There is evidence that future demographic
changes will result in the expansion of markets for
safety-improved products (see, for example, Rob-
erts et al. 1997). Factors include rising standards of
living, the apparent income elasticity of demand
for food safety, and increases in vulnerable popu-
lations (e.g., for foodborne pathogens, people with
suppressed immune systems and the aged). New
scientific and medical knowledge is likely to better
identify foodborne risks, those populations that are
most susceptible, and food purchasing and con-
suming practices that will reduce risk.
As noted, governments have relied on more di-
rect forms of regulation (e.g., process or perfor-
mance standards) for food safety and have made
only minor use of labeling policies, frequently dis-
couraging voluntary safety labeling. A major ratio-
nale for this approach is that direct regulation of-
fers more certain and consistent minimum stan-
dards of safety for all consumers. Regulators have
been concerned that substituting labeling and mar-
ket demand forces for direct regulation will not
create adequate incentives for firms to supply safer
products. They have also been concerned that la-
beling policies provide uneven levels of protection
across consumer groups, with the more highly edu-
cated and richer consumers being more protected
than the less educated and poorer because they are
better able to use label information and to afford
safer products. Thus labeling has rarely been used
as a stand-alone policy in the food safety area.
Governments have pursued varying policies for
labeling as a complement to other types of regula-
tion for food safety. One complementary use of
labeling is for companies to use it voluntarily to
differentiate safety levels above the minimum lev-
els set by direct regulation, This type of labeling
requires identification of important health risks;
specification of safety improvements related to
those risks that are significant enough to merit la-
beling (i.e., that represent real improvements on
which consumers may wish to base their buying
decisions); and design of label claims that effec-
tively communicate the safety attribute to consum-
ers. Policy design in this area is challenging. For
example, accurate labeling of levels of foodborne
pathogens may be difficult because these levels
can change after the product leaves the processing
plant. This raises the question of where in the dis-
tribution chain the safety level should be measured
and labeled. In some cases, governments have ac-
tively discouraged this type of labeling, believing it
is likely to be inherently deceptive because of dif-
ficulties in controlling product quality or because
the attribute being differentiated does not represent
a true safety difference relative to the standard
product.
An example of the use of labeling to differenti-
ate above the minimum quality standard is seen in
efforts to market pasteurized shell eggs in the
United States (Morales 1996; Roberts et al. 1997).154 October 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
The incidence of Salmonella enteritidis–related
foodborne infections increased more than threefold
in the United States from 1975 to 1993, with epi-
demiological evidence linking a high proportion of
the outbreaks to the consumption of Grade A shell
eggs. This incidence resulted in a variety of mea-
sures being undertaken, including tracing eggs
back to their flock of origin, improving production
practices, encouraging the use of pasteurized egg
products in food service operations, and educating
consumers about the danger of eating foods that
contain raw eggs.
Several companies responded to the situation by
developing processes for in-shell pasteurization of
eggs and beginning test marketing. For example, in
April 1996, Michael Foods (Minneapolis, Minn.)
began test marketing of its product under the Crys-
tal Farms Pasteurized Egg label. Prior to market-
ing, the company had conducted a telephone sur-
vey of Minnesota adults in order to define the
niche market for pasteurized eggs. Roberts et al.
(1997, p. 172) note that “the results showed that
95% of the samvle had heard about Salmonella.
75% responded ‘that they were aware that eggs
could carry Salmonella, and that chicken and eggs
were the two foods identified as most likely to
cause Salmonella food poisoning. ” Based on its
research, the company set the suggested retail price
for in-shell pasteurized eggs at $1.39 per dozen,
compared with the average price of ‘$0.85 per
dozen for large, Grade A, unpastuerized eggs.
Other competitors also entered this niche market,
some of whom sought certification by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture.
Pasteurized shell eggs are an example of mar-
keting of the safety attributes of a food product,
with a basic regulatory framework in place that
requires that label claims cannot be deceptive. Any
claims made by the companies regarding the safety
of the product are voluntary and subject to case-
by-case review by the U.S. government. There was
no mandatory labeling program for safety risks as-
sociated with eggs or formal program for regulat-
ing voluntary claims. As the market develops, the
need may arise for more formal systems to regulate
safety claims.
A secondary, complementary use of labeling in
the food safety area is to educate consumers about
safe use practices for the product. For example, a
government may not view it as economically or
technically feasible to eliminate all foodborne
pathogens from a food product. However, even
with foodborne pathogens being present, the food
may be safe to eat if properly handled and cooked
by the food service operator or consumer. In this
situation, labels that inform the user about safe
practices may be more effective than other types of
regulation in reducing foodborne illness.
‘An example of this”use is mandatory labeling in
the United States since 1994 to inform users about
recommended safe food handling practices for
fresh meat and poultry products. The U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture had rejected such labeling in
1987, arguing for voluntary efforts to educate con-
sumers about proper practices, However, the
agency rethought its position after a foodbome ill-
ness outbreak in the western United States in early
1993 related to E. coli 0157:H7 in undercooked
hamburgers. The mandatory labels were imple-
mented as a complement to a longer term, compre-
hensive revamping of food safety control systems
that includes the adoption of a Hazard Analysis at
Critical Control Points (HACCP) regulatory ap-
proach at the processing level.
The safe handling labels educate consumers and
other food handlers about practices that will reduce
foodbome risks associated with fresh meat and
poultry products. The label text notes: “This prod-
uct was prepared from inspected and passed meat
and/or poultry. Some food products may contain
bacteria that could cause illness if the product is
mishandled or cooked improperly. For your pro-
tection, follow these safe handling instructions. ”
The recommended practices include the following:
keep refrigerated or frozen; thaw in refrigerator or
microwave; keep raw meat and poultry separate
from other foods; wash working surfaces (includ-
ing cutting boards), utensils, and hands after touch-
ing raw meat and poultry; cook thoroughly; and
keep hot foods hot, refrigerate leftovers immedi-
ately or discard.
USDA’s rationale for the mandatory labeling
policy is that safe handling practices can effec-
tively reduce the risk of foodbome illness and that
many users are insufficiently aware of these prac-
tices. The label may differentiate fresh meat and
poultry products from other food products that do
not carry specific handling instructions. How this
informational labeling affects the market depends
on whether consumers see it as an indicator of a
risky product or take it as a simple reminder to use
good food handling practices.
Overall, governments have taken a cautious ap-
proach to the use of labeling as a policy tool for
food safety regulation. It is likely that consumer-
level, private markets for food safety attributes are
being stifled to some extent by governments’ re-
luctance to allow some forms of safety labeling.
There are also market and legal (e.g., tort liability)
factors that have resulted in companies being re-
luctant to market products based on safety
(Caswell and Johnson 1991). Serious policy designCaswell
questions exist related to the increased use of la-
beling for food safety attributes. Most difficult are
identifying important attributes and designing for-
mats that accurately communicate complex safety
information to consumers. As markets for safety
attributes develop, a key issue is the extent to
which a range of safety levels is offered on the
market. Price differentials and differing consumer
preferences may support a range of safety offer-
ings, but it is also possible that only products with
the highest safety level will be viable in the market.
Labeling of Process Attributes
Labeling of process attributes poses complicated
issues because specification of processes them-
selves can be complex and because the process
may affect a range of other attributes (e.g., safety,
nutrition). Regulators and consumers may care
about process attributes for a number of reasons.
First, there may be concerns about the impact of
use of the process on the final quality attributes of
consumer-ready products. Second, the process may
have impacts on the environment, animal welfare,
worker safety, or other important attributes.
In policy and public discussions, these two types
of concerns are often mixed together, leading to
significant confusion. On the one hand, voluntary
labeling with certification programs may be appro-
priate for process attributes that consumers care
about and are willing to pay for to get or avoid. On
the other hand, the labeling of process attributes
may be taken as an indicator of final, consumer-
level safety in cases where regulators believe it is
not, As a result, some countries have been reluctant
to allow labeling of process attributes that they
have judged to be safe in production and at the
consumer level. In some cases, companies that
wish to market based on these process character-
istics have been frustrated. In other cases, food
companies, and sometimes governments, may re-
sist labeling of process attributes because they op-
pose product differentiation based on a particular
attribute. The opposition may be due in part to
added costs in the supply chain related to segre-
gating products and verification. As with ~ood
safety, the fundamental impact of truthful labeling
of process attributes is to transform them from cre-
dence to search attributes. We look at two ex-
amples.
Foods Produced with the Use ofBiotechnology
Countries are pursuing diverse policies on the la-
beling of biotechnology-related inputs or products
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(materials and/or products produced from geneti-
cally modified organisms [GMOS], alternatively
referred to as genetically engineered organisms
[GEOS]). From the consumer viewpoint, the use of
biotechnology is a process attribute, which may
affect other attributes such as safety or nutrition as
well as other process attributes. For example, the
use of biotechnology (e.g., “Roundup Ready”
soybeans, bovine somatotropin [rbST] for milk
production) may raise concerns about the environ-
mental (e.g., possible increased pesticide use) or
animal welfare impacts of its use. In most cases,
the use of biotechnology is a credence attribute,
although it may also be a search or experience
attribute if it affects the appearance of the product
or its use characteristics.
The choice of labeling policy is important to
how markets for foods produced with the use of






Allow no labeling regarding the use or non-
use of GMOS.
Require mandatory labeling of products that
use GMOS.
Allow voluntary labeling of products that do
or do not use GMOS.
Allow voluntary labeling of products that do
not use GMOS, with an accompanying dis-
claimer noting the government’s judgment
about any differences (e.g., safety) between
products that use and those that do not use
GMOS.
The options have markedly different implications
for market development. Under the first option, no
differentiation is possible based on use or nonuse
of GMOS. This approach may be viewed as desir-
able by proponents of the new technology because
under it the use of GMOS is treated as no different
from the use of existing technologies. However,
this approach has the drawback of suggesting that
regulators and producers who use the technology
are afraid of consumer sovereignty and want to
suppress other,, producers’ ability to differentiate
products based on noriuse of the technology.
From a regulator’s point of view, the second
option of mandatory labeling of the use of GMOS
has the advantage of giving consumers full infor-
mation. However, if there are no real differences
between products that use and those that do not use
the technology, the label may not be useful to con-
sumers or could actually be deceptive and may
unnecessarily impede adoption of the technology.
Furthermore, labeling is not costless since it re-
quires segregation of product and verification. Us-
ers of GMOS also tend to oppose mandatory label-156 October 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
ing because they believe it will hurt market accep-
tance. Whether this is the case depends on the
market; companies are just beginning to explore
the possibility of marketing the use of GMOS as a
positive attribute (e.g., promoting a products’ ad-
vantages due to the use of new technology).
The third option of voluntary labeling has the
advantage of allowing producers to communicate
the absence or presence of the technology to con-
sumers, making it possible for them to choose
products that align with their preferences. This is
an attractive alternative because it relies on market
forces to determine the acceptance of new tech-
nologies. Under the fourth option, regulators may
seek to place restrictions on the form of voluntary
labeling to prevent what they view as possible con-
sumer deception. An example would be requiring a
disclaimer that there is no safety difference be-
tween products that use and those that do not use a
GMO technology on a label that says the technol-
ogy has not been used.
In the United States, the favored approach was
developed in the mid 1990s in response to the mar-
keting of dairy products from cows treated with
supplemental rbST. The U.S. Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) chose the last of the four policy
options, issuing guidelines that labels may not
claim milk products are ‘‘bST free” because the
hormone occurs naturally in milk, nor may they
claim to be ‘‘rbST free” because that implies the
milk is different. Products may state that they come
“from cows not treated with rbST” but should
also provide a proper context, for example, stating
that “no significant difference has been shown be-
tween milk derived from rbST-treated and non-
rbST-treated cows.” The FDA’s approach allows
voluntary labeling but also requires a disclaimer
that it views as necessary to prevent consumers
from being misled about safety differences. The
FDA approach is a middle ground under which
consumers can use labels to find products from
untreated cows and companies can market based
on the absence of rbST treatment, although the
scope of companies’ claims is limited by the dis-
claimer.
The FDA policy is representative of the U.S.
government’s overall position on the labeling of
the use of GMOS. The FDA believes its position is
consistent with guidance on labeling of GMOS be-
ing developed by the Codex Alimentarius Com-
mission’s Committee on Food Labeling, the inter-
national standards-setting body, The Codex posi-
tion assumes that safety is already established and
then recommends mandatory labeling of a food or
food ingredient produced with the use of a GMO
when it is no longer substantially equivalent to the
corresponding existing food or food ingredient as
regards composition, nutritional value, or intended
use. The U.S. government supports applying this
labeling standard equally to the use of all technolo-
gies. Beyond this, it supports the use of voluntary
labeling to the extent that the information provided
is truthful and not misleading.
The European Commission has been adopting
mandatory labeling, with some exceptions, of
foods obtained through the use of GMOS based on
consumers’ desire and right to know about this
process attribute. The United States opposes this
policy and argues that it causes a nontariff barrier
to trade in violation of recent trade agreements.
Thus whether labeling is voluntary or mandatory is
the key point of contention between the trading
partners’ preferred approaches.
Labeling allows markets to work more effec-
tively as producers that prefer to use or not use a
particular technology are more easily matched to
consumers who want to buy products with specific
process attributes, Voluntary labeling of the use or
nonuse of GMOS allows companies to choose a
production process and related marketing and la-
beling that maximize their own returns, while al-
lowing consumers to make choices based on a
range of price and process attribute combinations
offered in the market. This allows the market to
decide on the degree of acceptance of a new tech-
nology. Mandatory labeling of the use or nonuse of
GMOS serves the same purpose but does so at a
higher cost, in that the entire market must be seg-
regated and labeled even though only a portion of
products or consumers cares about the attribute,
Governments are likely to prefer voluntary or man-
datory approaches based on their perceptions of
what proportion of their citizens wants information
about the technology. In either case, labeling of
process attributes is likely to become more preva-
lent in the future. At a most basic level, gover-
nments will be called on to prevent deceptive prac-
tices regarding these types of claims. Food com-
panies will need to view labeling as an opportunity,
not a threat, and devise marketing strategies that
work with labeling policies.
Organic Foods
The use of organic labels is widespread to indicate
that food products have been produced and pro-
cessed under certain standards. Efforts are under
way to standardize the use of organic labels (e.g.,
Codex guidelines, the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture’s proposed rule) in order to protect consumers
against deception and protect producers of organic
products against misrepresentation of other agri-Caswell Food Safety and Process Labeling 157
cultural products as being organic when they do
not meet recognized standards. A voluntary or
mandatory organic labeling program requires the
detailed specification of practices that are consis-
tent with the label, This inciudes a materials ~ist;
production practices for crops and livestock; tran-
sition time from nonorganic production; who cer-
tifies compliance and how; and methods of com-
munication in the supply chain and to consumers.
In some cases, private programs may work effec-
tively to correct market imperfections, without re-
quiring a government program or requiring mini-
mal government involvement. For example, there
may be no need for a government program if farm-
ers or processors can effectively set organic pro-
duction standards, certify growers, and administer
labeling programs.
Organic products illustrate the possible links be-
tween process standards and final product quality.
In practice, one of the key reasons consumers de-
mand organic products is because they perceive
those products to be lower in pesticide residues
and, as a result, safer. Many consumers also de-
mand organic products because they believe their
production causes less environmental damage or
risk to workers, Demand for organic products tends
to surge in periods when concern about pesticide
residues is highest (e.g., during the publicity about
Alar use on apples in the United States).
However, there is no necessarv link between or-
ganic production/processing and-lower risk to con-
sumers from pesticide residues in foods. For ex-
ample, Codex’s Draft Guidelines for the Produc-
tion, Processing, Labeling, and Marketing of
Organically Produced Foods (1996) state that “or-
ganic agriculture is a holistic production manage-
ment system which promotes and enhances biodi-
versity, biological cycles, and soil biological activ-
ity, It is based on the low use of external inputs and
non-use of artificial fertilizers and pesticides . . . it
would be expected that substantially lower levels
of residues than those from effective uesticide use
would be achieved from organic management sys-
tems. In all cases such levels would not exceed
established maximum residue levels for agricul-
tural products and foodstuffs” (p. 2). While organic
practices are expected to result in lower residue
levels, at minimum those practices would result in
products being within established maximum resi-
due levels, which most governments seek to set at
a level that yields something akin to a reasonable
certainty of no harm. By accepted scientific stan-
dards there is likely to be little or no safety differ-
ential between organic and conventionally grown
produce from a consumer safety viewpoint, nor do
products need to show a safety differential in order
to carry an organic label.
Organic labeling standards are process standards
that always specify how a product is produced but
do not always specify performance attributes at the
consumer level, such as food safety. However,
many consumers use organic labels as a indicator
of pesticide residue safety. In that sense, the labels
effectively operate as safety labeling and are an
example of differentiation of products based on
perceived (or real, if the consumer views gover-
nment residue standards as inadequate) safety dif-
ferentials. Codex’s guidelines-setting efforts and
the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s proposed
rule-making on organic labeling focus on setting
process standards for the voluntary use of organic
labels, leaving the consumer safety issue ambigu-
ous.
Concluding Thoughts
The use of labeling to influence the operation of
markets for food safety and process attributes is
limited in at least three important respects not dis-
cussed above. First, space on the label itself is
limited and is in high demand for use by food
companies to market their products. Mandatory la-
beling programs use some of this precious space,
which marketers resist. Because only a limited
amount of label space may be used by labeling
regulations, governments must make decisions
about what are the highest and best uses of the
scarce labeling resource. These decisions involve
the choice of attributes to emphasize and the form
and length of messages. Second, mandatory label-
ing regulations may be limited by a country’s no-
tion of companies’ rights to commercial free
speech. Labeling regulations may be seen as an
infringement on companies’ rights to market their
products and use label space as they see fit. Fi-
nally, labeling is a scare resource in that consumers
devote ordy a limited amount of time to using label
information, especially at the point of purchase
(Caswell and Padberg 1992). This limitation also
suggests the need for careful consideration of the
highest and best uses of labeling regulations.
In general, labeling has been underutilized for
communicating the safety and process attributes of
food products. Voluntary and mandatory labeling
programs can improve the operation of markets for
food quality. Caution is required if labeling is to be
used as a substitute for other types of safety regu-
lation, such as process and performance standards,
because it will yield more variable levels of pro-
tection across consumer groups. The level of pro-158 October 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
tection consumers receive would depend more
upon their ability to process label information and
to pay for higher safety levels.
Mandatory labeling requirements should be re-
served for key attributes related to human health,
while voluntary labeling of other attributes, under
government guidelines where appropriate, is en-
couraged. Since a baseline level of safety is pro-
vided by regulatory approaches other than labeling,
in most cases voluntary labeling of safety levels
above the minimum is an appropriate policy. Simi-
larly, voluntary labeling is often most appropriate
for process attributes, allowing producers, proces-
sors, and consumers to match up with each other.
In all cases, the emphasis in labeling policy should
be on creating competitive markets for quality at-
tributes, such as food safety and process attributes,
and providing reasonable consumer protection. In
international trade, efforts to reduce or control bar-
riers related to labeling requirements are important,
particularly if labeling policy is used more inten-
sively by trading partners.
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